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ABSTRACT
This Article is set in the background of the consequences of the
WTO’s prescriptions on patenting of life-saving medications which has
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largely contributed to the morphing of patents on life-saving medication
into a luxury. Remarkably, there has been a transformation of the role of
patents in the context of pharmaceutical innovation into a strategic
business tool leading to a larger interest in creation and sustenance of
regulatory rights. The biggest global development in this area is an
increased effort to strengthen exclusivity using regulatory protections for
all chemicals, and even, biologics, involved in all stages of drug
development. Consequently, pharmaceutical companies have expertly
navigated this confluence of patents with regulatory data protection to
leverage themselves in a manner effectively creating high protection and
financial rewards for what materials that could otherwise be susceptible
for generic competition. This Article concerns itself with the regulatory
regime that effectively provides for exclusivity of clinical trial data. The
focus of the Article will be on how and why data exclusivity works for the
pharmaceutical industry to promote and/or protect market exclusivity
globally. Thus, the Article examines what data exclusivity is, the
international trade obligations relating to providing data exclusivity, and
the impact of the data exclusivity obligations on access to medication
issues, with a specific focus on developing countries while keeping the
U.S. regime as the vantage point to examine these issues. The Article
outlines how the data exclusivity regime can operate in parallel with the
patent regime to add a layer of protection for the data, thus adding to the
protection regime for chemical or biologic data. In doing so, this Article
will address some of the more controversial issues that have arisen
globally with reference to data exclusivity within the larger access to
medication debate.
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2017 marks another step closer to the 25th anniversary of
the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). 1 In the area
of intellectual property rights, particularly patents, one significant
phenomenon of the first quarter-century of the establishment of the WTO
is the morphing of patents on life-saving medication into a luxury. The
WTO’s global patent prescription largely helped establish economic
* Srividhya Ragavan is a Professor of Law at the Texas A&M University School of Law specializing
in international trade and intellectual property issues. The author wishes to extend thanks and
appreciation to Ms. Priyanka Sunjay, National Law University, Jodhpur, India for providing excellent
research for this Article.
1. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867
U.N.T.S. 154; see also The WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG. (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm [https://perma.cc/7QKV-KYAU].
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status as the marker distinguishing those that can access life-saving
medication from the rest of the population. Consequently, this decade
witnessed an elevated interest over the role of patents in the context of
pharmaceutical innovation. While patents continued to be an important
strategic business tool, there was a slow but a steady downgrading of
patents from its touted original position of being the unique economic
prescription to promote innovation. As such, the rhetoric of innovation,
which long served as a platform to nestle “patents,” was being challenged
in many industries and in many countries. From the United Statesthe
traditional flag-holder touting the benefits of patentsto developing
countries such as Indiawhich is a relatively newer graduate of the trade
regime 2the role of patents have come up for scrutiny. People generally
perceived patents, however unfairly, as the woe affecting pricing and thus
thwarting access to life-saving medication. While pricing was one of the
several questions that resulted in the permeation of pharmaceutical pricing
as an election issue in the United States, globally, pricing as well as other
policies became the subject of a larger access to medication debate. 3
In the United States, the Supreme Court’s decision highlighting the
low thresholds of biotechnology patents came at a time when academic
focus underscored how secondary patents potentially blocked
downstream innovations. 4 At a global level, international organizations

2. See, e.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of Uruguay, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L.
REV. 274 (2006) (detailing India’s process patent regime and its graduation into the TRIPS patent
regime).
3. In 2016, as the debate on the price of pharmaceuticals became one of the important election
issues in the United States, other issues that contribute to such an increase in price, such as patents,
came into the limelight. For example, in January of 2016, the U.S. News reported that 50 Democratic
members of the House, led by Rep. Lloyd Doggett, D-Texas, urged government agencies to consider
diluting or diminishing the exclusive rights over patents on pharmaceuticals. See Kimberly Leonard,
Can the Government Already Control Drug Prices, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 11, 2016),
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016/01/11/congressional-democrats-urge-nih-to-act-ondrug-prices. Similarly, in 2016, Senator Bernie Sanders and Representative Elijah Cummings sought
more information about the price increases for Iclusig, a drug used to treat chronic myeloid leukemia
which was priced at $199,000 for a year’s worth of treatment. See Sanders, Cummings Send Letter on
ARIAD’s
Staggering
Price
Increases,
(Oct.
20,
2016),
https://www.sanders.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/sanders-cummings-send-letter-on-ariadsstaggering-price-increases [https://perma.cc/CBY3-VJKG].
4. See, e.g., Thomas Faunce & Joel Lexchin, ‘Linkage’ Pharmaceutical Evergreening in
Canada and Australia, AUSTL. AND N. Z. HEALTH POL’Y (Biomed Central) (June 1, 2007); see also
Amy Kapczynski, Chan Park & Bhaven Sampat, Polymorphs and Prodrugs and Salts (Oh My!): An
Empirical Analysis of “Secondary” Pharmaceutical Patents, PLOS ONE (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0049470&type=printable
[https://perma.cc/5VBM-FLDL]; Amy Kapczynski, Engineered in India: Patent Law 2.0, 8 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 497, 497-99 (Aug. 8, 2013); Scott Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, When Do Generics
Challenge Drug Patents?, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD., 613, 613-49 (2011); Scott Hemphill & Bhaven
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affirmatively asserted that patents had transformed into a barrier to
promote global access to medication. 5 Further, nationally as well as
globally there was a marked increase in active participation by nongovernmental organizations as well as the public. For example, in
September 2017, a protest against the 1,157% price-increase by Eli Lilly
on diabetes drugs such as Humalog, whose patent had expired 75 years
ago, made the headlines, prompting protests outside the Eli Lilly
headquarters. 6 Overall, the effort to ensure accessibility and affordability
of pharmaceuticals resulted in the focus on patents broadening to an
extended consideration of related tools such as pricing, regulatory details,
innovation, and more. Consequently, on the one hand, the pharmaceutical
industry assumed a defensive posture denouncing reduction in patent
exclusivity as stifling innovation; on the other hand, the pharmaceutical
industry scrambled for tools and strategies to consolidate its exclusivity.
This Article will examine one such tool, being data exclusivity,
which has traditionally helped the pharmaceutical industry consolidate its
market exclusivity. 7 The focus of the Article is on how and why data
exclusivity works for the pharmaceutical industry to promote and/or
protect market exclusivity globally. Thus, the Article examines what data
Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J.
HEALTH ECON. 327, 327-39 (2012).
5. See The United Nations Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel Report on Access to
Medicines Report, UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 2016), http://www.unsgaccessmeds.org/final-report/
[https://perma.cc/JH7Y-CMZH] [hereinafter Report of United Nations]. A similar report issued by
the World Health Organization (WHO) relating to Hepatitis C treatment in lower income countries
highlighted a series of strategies involving generic medicines, licensing models, local production, and
differential pricing as being critical to enable lifesaving; see also Over 1 Million Treated with Highly
(Oct. 27,
2016),
Effective
Hepatitis
C
Medicines,
WORLD HEALTH ORG.
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2016/hepatitis-c-medicines/en/
[https://perma.cc/96LN-ZTCM]. This report highlights that “[l]icensing agreements and local
production in some countries have gone a long way to make these treatments more affordable.” Dr
Suzanne Hill, WHO Director for Essential Medicines and Health Products, has asserted the
importance of local production and pricing models to make medication accessible and affordable. Id.
See also Ed Silverman, Hepatitis C Drugs Remain Unaffordable in many Countries, PHARMALOT
(May 31, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/05/31/gilead-hepatitis-drug-prices-who/
[https://perma.cc/Z2A4-ABA7]. See generally Development Agenda for WIPO, WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/ [https://perma.cc/QA7Y-GDLV] (last
visited Apr. 20, 2018).
6. The Indianapolis Business Journal reported that over the past 20 years, while the price of
a gallon of milk climbed 23% and the sticker on a Dodge Caravan minivan rose 21%, the list price of
the insulin Humalog, made by Eli Lilly and Co., shot up 1,157%. Lilly’s other insulin, Humulin, on
the market since 1982, saw a price increase totaling nearly 800% over the last two decades. John
Russel, Lilly Insulin Prices Come Under Microscope, INDIANAPOLIS BUS. J. (Aug. 26, 2017),
https://www.ibj.com/articles/65163-lilly-insulin-prices-come-under-microscope?utm_source=thisweek-in-ibj&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=2017-08-26 [https://perma.cc/K4F5-L8C5].
7. See infra Section III, for definition of the terms.
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exclusivity is, the international trade obligations relating to providing data
exclusivity, and the impact of the data exclusivity obligations on access
to medication issues with a specific focus on developing countries while
keeping the U.S. regime as the vantage point to examine the issues. In
doing so, this Article will address some of the more controversial issues
that have arisen globally with reference to data exclusivity, within the
larger access to medication debate. The Article’s initial discussion on data
exclusivity, in Section II, is followed by an outline in Section III of the
historic origins of data exclusivity. Section IV provides a description of
Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement 8 and its requirements. Section V
addresses some of the recent questions from developing countries relating
to the global prescriptions in the TRIPS Agreement and its translations
into national policy specifically focusing on India as an example. The
conclusion highlights the need to be cautious in establishing data
exclusivity regimes.
II. DATA EXCLUSIVITY: DEFINITION & DEBATE
In order to appreciate why data exclusivity has become an important
tool to promote or protect market exclusivity, it is important to understand
what it is and how it operates. Thus, at the outset, this section outlines and
defines data exclusivity. Then, it highlights the role of the data with
reference to the pharmaceutical regulatory process. In doing so, this
section displays how the data protection regime operates alongside
patents. In all, this section provides the set-up for a discussion in the next
section on how data exclusivity operates to sustain/create market
monopoly, which, in turn, affects everyday access to medication for
people.
In simple terms, data exclusivity operates to provide protection of
data first submitted to a drug regulator to prove a chemical’s therapeutic
efficacy. The term “data exclusivity” refers to statutory provisions that
protect clinical trial data in such a manner that it results in prohibition of
reliance over the submitted data towards approval or submission of
abbreviated applications for generic versions. That is, data exclusivity
essentially treats the data of a drug generated in the course of clinical trials
submitted to marketing approval agencies, typically, government
regulatory agencies, as exclusive to the organization/corporation that

8. See Text of Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994), reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 365 (1995) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
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conducted the clinical trial. 9 In essence, for pharmaceuticals, data
exclusivity protects the information relating to clinical trial results data.
For example, if Drug A, whose patent is owned by innovator drug
company AMBA Inc., is effective against say, psoriasis, but results in
arthritis pain in patients, clinical trials over Drug A will show a pattern of
cure and of side effects. The data from the clinical trial will be essential
for national regulatory agencies, such as the Food and Drug
Administration in the United States, to clear the drug for marketing after
considering its safety.
It is common for most governments to regulate the marketing of
pharmaceutical and agricultural products to ensure that they are safe and
effective. Most governments seek assurances about the safety of the drug
from the manufacturer. Developed nations tend to get more opportunities
to test the evidence of safety and effectiveness as part of the marketing
approval process, essentially because they are typically the markets where
new drugs are first launched. Each country can seek a different type or
amount of evidence of safety and efficacy. Some countries (e.g., the
United States, European Community, and Japan) statutorily require the
submission of an extensive amount of data to prove the safety of drugs,
even if the product was approved by another government. 10 Thus,
globally, all regulatory agencies will require drugs to undergo data testing
before it is approved. Before a drug can be approved for marketing, the
drugs are required to undergo detailed clinical testing to ensure it is safe
and efficacious. Such testing is more rigorous for New Chemical Entities
(NCEs) to ensure its safety. 11
Innovator pharmaceutical companies have been successful in
asserting that the clinical trial data generated needs to be exclusive to the
company that conducts the clinical trial. Pharmaceutical companies assert
that such exclusivity of the data allows the drug company to recoup the
investment on clinical trials, which can run up to four separate phases
involving several patients, their confidential information, treatment

9. But see Erika Lietzan, The Myth of Data Exclusivity, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 91, 110,
118 (2016) (asserting that data exclusivity “is not a grant of anything to anyone” and that, from a
regulatory perspective, “a subsequent entrant may file full applications for copies or near copies”).
But, the article does not discuss the effect on consumers but creates a definitional distinction without
fully exploring the practical real-life impact.
10. G. Lee Skillington & Eric M. Solovy, The Protection of Test and Other Data Required by
Article 39.3 of the TRIPS Agreement, 24 Nw. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 1, 6 (2003).
11. A new chemical entity (NCE) is, according to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, a
drug that contains no active moiety that has been approved by the FDA in any other application
submitted under section 505(b) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. 21 C.F.R. § 314.108(a)
(2016).
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regimen, and information on side effects and safety regimes of the
medication. 12 It is a fact that the cost of undertaking the tests is
considerable, involves human subjects, and can therefore be an arduous
exercise. That said, the return for the risk of investing in creating new
chemicals/compounds/drugs is a patent that gives a market monopoly for
20 years. 13 Arguably, the test data highlighting the efficacy of a chemical
need not be rewarded separately, especially if the monopoly for being the
reward detrimentally affects access to medication for two reasons. First,
the patent statute provides a 20-year exclusivity for new pharmaceutical
innovations; 14 second, independent Drug Information Journals repeatedly
assert that the rate of “truly innovative” new medicines ranges as low as
approximately 2–3%. 15
In practice, a vast majority of so-called “new medicines,” including
those that are currently benefitting from patent protection, typically
represent minor improvements over existing standards. 16 Considering
this, data protection works as a mechanism to add a layer of a different
type of market protection. In effect, data exclusivity operates to provide a
layer of protection in addition to patent protection for the data gathered by
innovator drug companies. Needless to specify, just like patents, data
12. Kristina Lybecker, When Patents Aren’t Enough: The Case for Data Exclusivity for
Biologic Medicines, IP WATCHDOG (July 9, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/07/09/patentsarent-enough-data-exclusivity-for-biologic-medicines/id=50318/
[https://perma.cc/Q7PN-43BX].
See also Trudo Lemmens & Shannon Gibson, Decreasing The Data Deficit: Improving Postmarket
Surveillance In Pharmaceutical Regulation, 59 MCGILL L. J. 943 (2014) (arguing that drug regulation
would benefit from less industry control and highlighting how historically grown drug regulations
have contributed to the development of industry control over clinical trials, which is one of the key
factors behind the limits of pre-market evidence).
13. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1952).
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Brian Godman et al., Are new Models Needed to Optimize the Utilization of new
Medicines to Sustain Healthcare Systems?, 8 EXPERT REV. OF CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 77, 79
(2015)
http://dx.doi.org/10.1586/17512433.2015.990380
[https://perma.cc/V94N-ELVP]
(“Prescrire, a critical independent drug information journal, believed only 2% of new medicines or
new indications for existing medicines in France were innovative and/or offered a real therapeutic
advantage over existing treatments despite the hype.”).
16. See New drugs, new indications in 2015: little progress, and threats to access to quality
PRESCRIRE
136
(2016)
healthcare
for
all,
36
REV.
english.prescrire.org/en/3D3B93E1C3DE20A599FBA073C5442463/Download.aspx
[https://perma.cc/2M98-663R]; see also Prescrire Editorial Staff, New Products and new Indications
in 2016: a System that Favours Imitation over the Pursuit of real Progress, 37 REV. PRESCRIRE 136
(2017)
english.prescrire.org/en/955912A2E87C92B676874FA2C1354846/Download.aspx
[https://perma.cc/84EN-FKNV] [hereinafter New Products, 2016] (“Little therapeutic progress was
made in 2016, yet many medicines with no clinical value, uncertain efficacy or an unfavourable harmbenefit balance were authorized. This is due at least in part to the current system that drives
pharmaceutical research and development. The primary focus is neither on patients’ needs nor on
delivering genuine therapeutic advances at affordable prices.”).
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exclusivity has come to represent an important tool for innovator
companies to preserve market exclusivity to help keep the price of the
pharmaceutical product high. Thus, in this Article, the term “market
exclusivity” refers to the exclusive status that a drug enjoys because of
data protection irrespective of whether the drug benefits from patent or
any other form of protection. In other words, by protecting clinical trial
data over a drug, the chemical components of which may even be in the
public domain, the resulting exclusivity that the company enjoys in the
market is termed as market exclusivity.
In the U.S., schemes such as orphan drug exclusivity and pediatric
drug exclusivity are both examples of regulatory schemes that provide a
new lease of “market” exclusivity by precluding submission or approval
of any competing application even though the chemical in the drug may
have been known and used for several years in the United States. In effect,
this Article asserts that data exclusivity creates market exclusivity thus
preventing competing applications that can benefit the consumers and
lower the cost of the medication. 17
III. HISTORIC ORIGIN & INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS OF DATA
EXCLUSIVITY
The following section outlines two important aspects. First, it
outlines the historic origins of the data exclusivity regime. Appreciating
the historic origins of this regime is critical to appreciate the role of data
protection to determine whether and how data protection can, from an
economic, political, and trade perspective, serve national interests.
Second, it elaborates on the international obligations outlined under
Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement to appreciate the breadth, limits, and
built-in flexibilities of the international obligation that governs this
regime.
Historically, data exclusivity evolved from unfair competition
principles. Over a period, the concept of data exclusivity, while grounded
on unfair competition principles, evolved into a more sui generis form of
an intellectual property right. The underlying rationale or justification is
based on the principle that it is unfair if data collected at the expense of
one party becomes available for use by other parties to gain unfair
commercial advantage.

17. Other writers have used the term “market exclusivity” to refer to prohibitions on
submission or approval of any competing application, even if supported by a full complement of
original data. See, e.g., Lietzan, supra note 9.
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Internationally, for the first time, unfair competition principles were
captured as the basis for data exclusivity in Article 10bis of the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property. 18 The basic outline
of Article 10bis is that it requires member countries to provide for
“effective protection against unfair competition.” 19 The Paris Convention
defined the term “unfair competition” as “any act of competition contrary
to honest practices in industrial or commercial matters.” 20 As part of the
protection against unfair competition, Article 10bis of the Paris
Convention sought to: 1) establish “honest practices in industrial or
commercial matters”; and 2) prevent actions such as dishonest
manufacturing and other practices that mislead the public as to the nature
and quality of the goods. 21
The establishment of the WTO22 resulted in the inclusion of
intellectual property laws within the larger umbrella of trade. Thus, the
TRIPS Agreement, which established minimum standards of intellectual
property provisions, also incorporated the provisions of the Paris
Convention. 23 The entire Part 7 of the TRIPS Agreement, which includes
Article 39, elaborates three types of protections “[i]n the course of
ensuring effective protection against unfair competition.” These are: 1)
protection against unfair competition as detailed in the Paris Convention;
2) protection of “undisclosed information” as outlined in paragraph 2 of
Article 39; and 3) protection for “data submitted to governments or
governmental agencies” as outlined in paragraph 3 of Article 39. 24 The
following discussion captures each of the different types of protections
envisaged under Article 39 of TRIPS.
A.

Protection Against Unfair Competition

The Paris Convention, from where the TRIPS provisions were
imported, outlines three aspects as forming a part of the obligations of
members to establish protection against unfair competition. Subsection 3
of Article 10bis provides three specific examples of actions that represent
unfair competition. 25 They are: 1) action that creates confusion with

18. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, as last revised
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 at art. 10 [hereinafter Paris Convention].
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See World Trade Organization, supra note 1.
23. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, Art. 39(2).
24. Id. at Art. 39(3).
25. Paris Convention, supra note 18.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 51 [2017], Iss. 4, Art. 6

1172

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[51:1163

goods, or the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor; 2) false
allegations in the course of trade that result in discrediting the goods, or
the industrial or commercial activities, of a competitor; 26 and 3)
misleading indications or allegations which misrepresent the nature,
manufacturing process, characteristics, quality, or quantity of goods. 27
The three examples specifically outline activities that lead to an unfair
commercial advantage. This provision forms the basis for the TRIPS
provisions dealing with undisclosed information. Importantly, none of the
listed examples in the Paris Convention make any reference to
undisclosed information. Hence, it is arguable that undisclosed
information, which is the crux of the TRIPS provisions, does not fall
within the larger umbrella of the first requirement of the Paris Convention,
being unfair competition.
B.

Protection of “Undisclosed Information” as Outlined in Paragraph
2 of Article 39

Article 39.2 of TRIPS relates to protection for undisclosed
information, or, protection of trade secrets. In essence, it requires
members to guarantee protection for any information that has commercial
value which the owner lawfully controls and deems as a secret. 28 This
protection prevents unlawful disclosure by any means to ensure honesty
in commercial transactions. Thus, any information, such as customer lists,
internal manuals, parts information in factories, or such other information,
can qualify for protection as long as the owner of the information believes
that it has commercial value and maintains its secrecy. It is important to
appreciate that TRIPS does not necessitate members to establish a trade
secret statute (such as the state statutes in the United States which treat
trade secrets as a form of property). It merely requires members to assure
protection for undisclosed information. 29
A protection regime for undisclosed information may be structured
using the law of contract or other areas of law, which continues to remain
the norm in some member countries. Thus, breach of contract, breach of
confidence, and unlawful or fraudulent acquisition of undisclosed
information by third-parties can also form a part of the cause of action
under Article 39.2. Historically, countries have differed widely on the
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at Art. 39(2).
29. Id.; see also Overview: the TRIPS Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel2_e.htm [https://perma.cc/KT9L-JCNM]; TRIPS
Agreement, supra note 8.
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subject of protection of trade secret laws. Many of the differences have
been owed to the question of whether the country treats trade secrets as a
form of property. For instance, most European countries do not conceive
of trade secrets as property. In fact, trade secrets are not considered as a
form of an exclusive intellectual property right. Thus, they are not subject
to the EU Enforcement Directive. 30 Instead, the EU Enforcement
Directive provides for certain procedures and remedies to ensure that there
is a sufficient and consistent level of civil redress in the internal market in
the event of unlawful acquisition, use, or disclosure of a trade secret.31 It
merely facilitates the investigation and pursuit of intellectual property
claims within the Union. In any case, Article 39.2 does not necessitate or
mandate data exclusivity provisions. This view is supported by Shamnad
Basheer in his exhaustive treatment of Article 39 of TRIPS where he
outlines that a number of developing countries have adopted the view that
TRIPS does not mandate undisclosed information to be treated as property
and does not require granting of exclusive rights to the owner of the data.32
C.

Protection for “Data Submitted to Governments or Governmental
Agencies” as Outlined in Article 39.3
Article 39.3 of TRIPS states the following:
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new
chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the
origination of which involves a considerable effort, shall protect such
data against unfair commercial use. In addition, Members shall protect
such data against disclosure, except where necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are protected against
unfair commercial use. 33

Thus, Article 39.3 requires members to provide protection against the
unfair commercial use or disclosure of undisclosed test or other data that:
1) are submitted for the purposes of getting marketing approval for
pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products; and 2) involved the use

30. Directive (EU) 2016/943 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2016
on the Protection of Undisclosed know-how and Business Information (Trade Secrets) Against their
Unlawful Acquisition, use and Disclosure, OFFICIAL J. OF THE EUR. UNION (May 15, 2016), http://eurlex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32016L0943 [https://perma.cc/YHJ2-AP7N].
31. Id.
32. Shamnad Basheer, Protection of Regulatory Data Under Article 39.3 of TRIPS: The Indian
Context (2006).
33. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at Art. 39(3).
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of new chemical entities, the origination of which involves considerable
effort, except when the data is required to protect the public. 34
Data exclusivity relates to the second requirement in Article 39 of
the TRIPS Agreement (or the third form, depending on how it is viewed)
and relates to protection for data submitted to regulators, governments, or
governmental agencies to get market approval. The submitted data is
usually critical to prove the safety of the application material/drug. The
details of such protection are outlined in paragraph 3 of Article 39 of
TRIPS and relate solely to “the submission of undisclosed test or other
data” made as part of the approval process for marketing of
pharmaceutical or agricultural chemical products which utilize new
chemical entities. 35 The protection is against unfair commercial use of
“undisclosed test or other data” submitted to the FDA or the equivalent
agencies provided it involves a considerable effort.36 The protection
regime means to prevent the disclosure of the data and the unfair
commercial use of the data. There is one exception though in Article 39.3,
and that is where the data is deemed necessary to “protect the public.” 37
For example, assume Company A has Drug XYZ for the cure of acne
for which it plans to apply for patent protection. During this time, the
company conducts clinical trials of over 300 patients and determines that
the drug is safe to be used to treat acne. After the clinical trial is concluded,
Company A submits the clinical trial information as part of the approval
for marketing the drug. The data from the clinical trial may reveal
information about the properties of the drug. For example, it can show that
the drug is more effective on adolescents who have had a history of
asthma, or that the drug can cause dangerous side effects on adolescents
who have had a history of, say, childhood diabetes. At this time, Company
A has two specific approval processes in place. First is to get a patent on
XYZ, and the next is to benefit from data protection for the clinical trial
data collected about XYZ. These are two distinct, parallel processes and
provide two layers of protection. First, Company A can get patent
protection and benefit from the patent protection (which will allow the
company to charge monopoly prices during the patent term) provided the
drug clears the statutory requirements such as novelty and
nonobviousness. Second, data exclusivity provisions result in protecting
the data and preventing the use of the clinical trial information by a
competitor during the data exclusivity term. The second layer of
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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protection is independent of patent protection provided it involved
considerable effort in collecting the data.
For innovator pharmaceuticals, protecting the clinical trial data
provides an economic opportunity by creating a new market (thus, the
definition of market exclusivity) on the information relating to safety of
the drug. Thus, it helps provide market exclusivity for a compound that
may even fail the scrutiny for protection under the patent statute. 38 Critics
point out correctly that pharmaceutical companies do prefer to make
general trial information available at the earliest opportunity with a view
to boost share prices. For example, with Drug XYZ, it would be common
for Company A to highlight general trial information of the drug, such as
that it can cure acne with very little side effects, without discussing severe
side effects on segments of population, such as minors on asthma
medication or children with diabetes. 39 The general clinical trial
information about drugs are increasing and proactively tracked among
health authorities as well as venture capitalists for various market related
reasons, such as determining potential funding models. 40 Release of
limited but early trial information can allow pharmaceutical companies to
seek more funding for the launch of their new medicines. But, such
general disclosures of pharmaceutical companies aimed at securing
funding need to be carefully distinguished from data that bear critical
patient information, including side effects and success details, which will
remain protected under data protection laws.
IV. COURSES OF ACTION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The above discussion highlighted the historical origins, the
prevailing form of data exclusivity, and some of the international as well
as trade law questions involved with it, including the built-in flexibilities
in Article 39 of TRIPS. The discussion below ventures into the question

38. See definition of market exclusivity, supra Section II.
39. But see New Products, 2016, supra note 16, at note 2 (asserting how new products in the
year 2016 represented no or limited therapeutic advancement; further discussing how pharmaceuticals
are approved applications without demanding adequate supporting data of clinical trials).
40. There is an increasing level of pro-activity among health authorities in Europe to track new
medicines early and feed this information into their potential funding models. See, e.g., Irene Eriksson
et al., The Early Awareness and Alert System in Sweden: History and Current Status, 8 FRONTIERS
IN
PHARMACOLOGY 674 (Oct.
5,
2017),
https://doi.org/10.3389/fphar.2017.00674
[https://perma.cc/RCX4-7FKK]; see also Rickard Malmstrom et al., Dabigatran - A Case History
Demonstrating the Need for Comprehensive Approaches to Optimize the Use of New Drugs, 4
FRONTIERS IN PHARMACOLOGY 39 (May 14, 2013), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pmc/articles/PMC3653065/ [https://perma.cc/X4HF-UDWP] (discussing example of activities
between European countries to share data).
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of the options developing countries have and how these options could
affect these nations. In doing so, this section attempts to provide
guidelines especially for developing countries that are considering
adopting a regime of data exclusivity styled along the lines of what
prevails in the United States. The section below outlines questions that
arise from the built-in flexibilities of Article 39.3 and questions that arise
when effectuating a data exclusivity regime in other countries.
The most important element of Article 39 is the breadth. The rhetoric
from innovative pharmaceutical companies, notwithstanding the broad
prescription in Article 39.3, is meant to give WTO members the freedom
to set their own rules in a flexible manner with a view to specifically
facilitate members to interpret the Article’s principal terminology. 41 Each
element of the Article has built-in flexibilities that may be critical to
achieve national objectives for developing countries.
A.

Defining “Undisclosed” Test Data

Under Article 39.3, WTO Members have an obligation to protect
undisclosed data against unfair commercial use. Typically, undisclosed
data relates to clinical trial information disclosed to regulators but deemed
undisclosed to third parties. The underlying rationale behind treating data
disclosed to regulators as “undisclosed” is that innovator pharmaceutical
companies invest money into generating safety details and data for new
and innovative drugs or combinations. 42 That is, Company A invests
money by conducting clinical trials on the drug to determine its efficacy.
If that data is allowed to be used by a second applicant for getting
marketing approval for the same drug, in effect that regulatory practice
gives an unfair commercial advantage to the second applicant in that the
second applicant does not have to generate the data which was required
of the first applicant and hence results in significant economic saving. 43
While this reasoning is cited to explain the rationale behind data
41. Wael Armouti & Mohammad F.A. Nsour, Data Exclusivity for Pharmaceuticals: Was It
the Best Choice for Jordan Under the U.S.- Jordan Free Trade Agreement?, 17 OREGON REV. OF INT.
L.
258,
260
(2016),
https://law.uoregon.edu/images/uploads/entries/Nsour.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VDM5-466R].
42. Jacques Gorlin, Encouragement of New Clinical Drug Development: The Role of Data
Exclusivity, INT’L FED’N OF PHARMACEUTICAL MANUFACTURERS ASS’N (IFPMA) (2000),
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/en/DataExclusivity_2000.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NN7E-UAMS].
43. Id. at 15; Protection of Undisclosed Information and Control of Anti-Competitive
Practices, APEC TRIPS Seminar: 17-19 May 1995, Presentation by New Zealand,
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/topics/ip/en/DataExclusivity_2000.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B7R3-P8YJ].
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exclusivity, it is important to note that a competing generic applicant tends
to price the drug much lower, thus, benefitting the consumer. Moreover,
as mentioned earlier, conducting clinical trials is a part of the risk that
innovator companies undertake in order to gain the enormous market
benefits that come with patent protection. Generally, the first applicant
typically seeks patent protection which, if successful, leads to monopoly
profits during the statutory period of exclusivity meant to recoup
“research and development.” 44 While Article 39 necessitates protection of
undisclosed data, the breadth of the language and lack of definition of the
terms is in consideration of the fact that not all countries were convinced
that patent protection would not adequately help recoup the cost of clinical
trials. 45
B.

“Undisclosed” to Whom?

Article 39 necessitates protection of data disclosed to regulators and
thus raises the question of whether the obligation to not disclose the data
applies only against third parties or does it include the
regulators/government officials of the members. The negotiating history
of Article 39.3 of TRIPS suggests “non-reliance on the originator’s data
for a particular period of time” as the definition of the obligation to protect
the data against “unfair commercial use.” 46 Typically, governments do
44. The role of patent protection to minor innovation and how it detrimentally affects the cost
of medication has become a matter of debate. Researchers and international organizations have
highlighted the importance of access to medication issues. See, e.g., Experts in Chronic Myeloid
Leukemia, The Price of Drugs for Chronic Myeloid Leukemia (CML) is a Reflection of the
Unsustainable Prices of Cancer Drugs: From the Perspective of a Large Group of CML Experts, 121
BLOOD J. 4439 (2013), http://www.bloodjournal.org/content/121/22/4439?sso-checked=true
[https://perma.cc/KG5B-PVTD]; see also Report of the United Nations, supra note 5; see generally
WHO study, PHARMALOT (May 31, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/05/31/gileadhepatitis-drug-prices-who/ [https://perma.cc/SX83-MJDE]. See also Over 1 Million Treated with
Highly Effective Hepatitis C Medicines, supra note 5; Narcyz Ghinea et al., If We Don’t Talk about
Value, Cancer Drugs will Become Terminal for Health Systems, THE CONVERSATION (July 26, 2015),
http://theconversation.com/if-we-dont-talk-about-value-cancer-drugs-will-become-terminal-forhealthsystems-44072 [https://perma.cc/KWY6-EWP3] (discussing a group of oncologists urging
patients to talk about the price of medications).
45. JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, 199 (Kluwer Law International) (2001); see also Skillington & Solovy, supra note 10,
at 15 (discussing how U.S., Swiss, and European proposals were used for the Uruguay Round
Negotiations and also discussing why developing countries should give lesser protection for test data).
46. Skillington & Solovy, supra note 10, at 20 (citing Jaques J. Gorlin, AN ANALYSIS OF THE
PHARMACEUTICAL-RELATED PROVISIONS OF THE TRIPS (INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY) AGREEMENT
48 (1999)) (“United states negotiators agreed to drop the non-reliance language, because they viewed
the phrase as no more than ‘belts and suspenders’; that is, the accepted definition at the time of
‘production against unfair commercial use’ included non-reliance for a fixed period of time for new
chemical entities and the second phrase was, therefore, not need.”).
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not rely on the data as much as use it to examine or analyze the data
towards approval. Under Article 39, governments have a clear duty to
ensure non-reliance of undisclosed data by third parties on the originator’s
data. An early draft of the agreement dated November 23, 1990 may be
informative on the question of whether governments are also required to
not rely on the data. The 1990 draft outlined that “the data may not be
relied upon for the approval of competing products for a reasonable time,
generally no less than five years . . . .” 47 A plain reading of this draft
suggests that governments could not rely on the data for approving
competing products. This draft was meant to be included as a
recommendation and not an obligation under Article 39.3. However, this
draft was not adopted. Instead, the currently prevailing broad language
was inserted into Article 39 leaving room for the possibility that, under
the final agreement, the language regarding extending the non-disclosure
obligation remain flexible for countries to take a variant approach.
C.

What Amounts to “Unfair Commercial Use?”

Article 39 requires that undisclosed information not be used in a
manner resulting in an unfair commercial advantage. The definition of
“unfair commercial use” remains closely tied to the definition of
undisclosed information, discussed above. In fact, the terms of Article
39.3 are couched using the definition of the term “unfair commercial use”
as the basis. 48 Perhaps, the most outstanding and controversial question
revolving around this phrase is whether the use of the data by a
government authority would amount to “unfair commercial use,” or would
it be legitimate use by the state?
The terms “unfair” and what amounts to “commercial use” are
undefined in the TRIPS Agreement, thus providing the flexibility for
members to define the elements constituting unfair commercial use. It
would be advantageous to define these terms using a national scale, while
carefully considering national health requirements. Developing countries
may and should choose to define the terms strictly to include uses of the
data by a commercial/corporate entity but in a manner leaving out the use
of the data by government authorities. Arguably, the use of the data by
government authorities for public or administrative purposes can and will
indirectly qualify as commercial because it would facilitate use by a thirdparty applicant. On a plain reading, TRIPS does not elaborate on

47.
48.

Id. at 32.
Id.
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“indirect” commercial use. In any case, such indirect use may still be
justified under the Article’s broad “public use” exception. 49
Alternately, the intermediate position that also conforms to TRIPS is
for national governments to consider instituting specific public interestbased exceptional circumstancessuch as when a compulsory license has
been issued conforming with the TRIPS requirementsto permit such
indirect commercial use of the data by regulators. Chile’s Industrial
Property Law serves as a great example of this. When, on account of a
bilateral free trade agreement with the United States, Chile reluctantly
introduced data exclusivity provisions, it carved out several public
interest-based exceptions to the exclusive rights over the data (as well as
over the patent monopoly) such as including “reasons of public health,
national security, public noncommercial use, national emergency, or other
circumstances of extreme urgency; or, the pharmaceutical product is the
subject of a compulsory license.” 50
Overall, countries such as India would benefit from following the
developing country position submitted in 2001 to the TRIPS Council
asserting that a drug regulatory authority’s use of originator test data as a
basis for granting approval to a generic product did not constitute an
“unfair commercial use.” 51 Having taken that position in the international
forum, developing countries should not hesitate to institute it in national
legislation. Thus, what amounts to unfair use in a commercial manner
needs elaboration using national health care requirements. The
requirement in Article 39 is grounded on the assumption that without data
exclusivity, the originators of the innovative drug would be placed at an
unfair commercial disadvantage when compared to their generic
competitors; especially when considering their investments in conducting
the clinical trials to meet the mandated requirements set by regulatory
bodies for drug approval. But, generic manufacturers sell at a fraction of
the cost, in turn, benefitting the consumers. For countries that prioritize
access to medication and national health care, it is worth prioritizing
consumer interests. Countries such as India, where healthcare tends to be
an individual expense, should carefully take these parameters into due
consideration.

49.
50.

Id. at 34-35.
Industrial Property Law, 19.039 (2006) (Chile); see also CARSTEN FINK, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENT POLICIES FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK
394 (Jean-Pierre Chauffour & Jean-Christophe eds., 2011).
51. Developing Country Group’s Paper, TRIPS: Council Discussion on Access to Medicines,
WORLD TRADE ORG. (June 19, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/
paper_develop_w296_e.htm [https://perma.cc/REF9-LDEP].
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The built-in flexibility in Article 39 should effectively be used by all
countries, especially those that are in the developing spectrum, to
mandatorily outline that the use by government authorities to assess the
efficacy and toxicity of a pharmaceutical product does not amount to
“unfair commercial use.” Thus, the prevalence of “unfair commercial use”
should automatically be deemed if or when a competitor directly accessed
the originator’s submitted test data during the protection period. As such,
such a reading would be in line with the requirement in Article 39.3 and
will result in governments protecting the innovator’s data from unfair
access by third parties.
Not all scholars agree with this line of interpretation. For instance, a
view in opposition expounded by Shamnad Basheer terms the above as a
“permissive reliance model.” 52 Mr. Basheer disagrees with this model and
asserts that a closer look at the wording of Article 39.3 suggests that the
obligation to “[p]revent unfair commercial use of regulatory data is
primarily addressed to regulatory agencies/government, as opposed to a
private third party likely to have access to regulatory data in an
unauthorized manner.” 53 He asserts that any reading of the term “unfair”
in a manner allowing regulatory authorities to rely on originator’s data to
approve a competing generic product is flawed. 54 He seems to favor the
“compensatory liability model,” which suggests that governments can
rely on the data only when compensation is provided. 55 The compensatory
liability model, in suggesting that regulators need to compensate for
relying on the originator’s data, treats the data as property. Even Mr.
Basheer himself agrees that Article 39 of TRIPS does not mandate the
treatment of the data as property. 56 In any case, even within taking the
compensatory liability model proposed by Mr. Basheer, governments
should still be able to carve out a “public interest-based” reliance
exception. One example would be where protected data is used towards
the approval of a generic drug when a compulsory license has been issued
in compliance with the TRIPS prescription. Such allowance will be in
consumer interest and can facilitate the immediate marketing of the drug
either as soon as the patent or the data exclusivity period expires, as the
case is.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Basheer, supra note 32, at 19.
Id. at 20.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 16.
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What is a New Chemical Entity?

Just like the other terms, the term “new chemical entity” has not been
defined under Article 39. The lack of definition provides adequate breadth
and flexibility for members to define the term based on national interest.
Drug regulatory agencies, such as the USFDA, define a “new chemical
entity” as a drug “that contains no active moiety that has been approved
by FDA in any other application submitted under section 505(b) of the
Act.” 57 This is a classic example of how each country can define the term
based on the type of industry it wants to protect. There is nothing in the
Article that requires the definition of a new chemical entity to relate to the
time when the active ingredient was first discovered or synthesized. 58
The following example underscores the need to define NCEs
carefully. Assume Company A files for patent protection and also seeks
approval for marketing of Drug MNO. Now, assume that Competitor B
opposes the patent application successfully such that the patent
application is denied. The information in the patent application will fall
into the public domain and can be rightfully used by generic drug
companies. The question is whether the application material, being MNO,
will continue to be considered a “new” chemical entity for the purposes
of the marketing of MNO. That is, whether the denial of patent protection
should result in the chemical entity losing its status of “new chemical
entity” for regulatory purposes.
A definition that follows the United States for defining a new
chemical entity will result in providing data exclusivity for a period of
five to seven years even when the patent application has failed. Thus,
Company A will benefit from an indirect market monopoly (which, in this
Article, is termed as market exclusivity) over the Drug MNO for the
period when the clinical trial data is considered exclusive even though its
patent has been denied. That is, when the patent is denied leaving MNO
susceptible for use by a generic drug company, it will still prevent such
companies to get marketing approval for MNO. This is because the test
data (the data on the drug’s success for use against acne, its side effects
information, etc.) are protected under the data exclusivity regime of the
United States. Therefore, a generic drug company will be unable to use
the innovator’s clinical data as part of its application to seek marketing

57. See Small Business Assistance: FAQ for New Drug Product Exclusivity, FDA (Feb. 11,
2016), www.fda.gov/drugs/developmentapprovalprocess/smallbusinessassistance/ucm069962.htm
[https://perma.cc/C96Y-8SK5].
58. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 505(b), 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1938); but see Gorlin,
supra note 42.
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approval before the end of the data exclusivity period, which is a good
seven years during which time consumers will be unfairly denied access
to medication otherwise in the public domain. For consumers, Company
A’s market exclusivity comes at a financial cost as well as at the cost of
access to the medication. Of course, generic drug companies are free to
conduct their own clinical trials considering that the drug is not a subject
of patent protection. 59 But, such duplication of clinical trials will result in
subjecting a new set of patients to the same clinical trial and involves
additional: 1) cost to conduct the trial; and 2) delay in manufacturing the
generic drug while the trial is being conducted. Thus, generic drug
companies duplicating a clinical trial already conducted elsewhere will
result in duplicative burdens in terms of time and cost. While the cost of
the trial will be added to the cost of the drug and passed onto consumers
by unnecessarily raising the cost of generic drugs, the delay from
duplicating the clinical trial will result in delaying access to the
consumers.
Importantly, Article 39 necessitates protection of “new” chemical
entities. But, it should be up to the member country to define the
constituents of “new” chemical entities. The language in Article 39
provides adequate flexibility to construe the term differently. Thus, there
is nothing to prevent a member from treating a chemical whose patent has
been invalidated or denied as not being “new.” After all, innovator
pharmaceuticals have asserted that patent status should be linked to
providing regulatory clearance (patent linkage). 60 Along the same lines,
countries that house generic drug companies should connect patent status
with the definition of “new” for the purposes of defining NCEs. Needless
to highlight, originator pharmaceutical companies prefer an interpretation
that treats the term “new chemical entities” as a regulatory concept
separate from the “novelty” requirement of patent protection, although
there is no basis for such a treatment. 61

59. But see Lietzan, supra note 9, at 95 (asserting that data exclusivity does not truly fall within
“exclusivity” because it creates a different path for a second applicant).
60. See, e.g., Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) Special 301
(2014),
http://phrma-docs.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2014-special-301-submission.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6EPS-SZGC] (asserting the need for linkage to impose unilateral pressure on
countries even though it is not a trade obligation); see also Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration
Apartheid: Taming Data Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 343
(2008); see also Ron Bouchard et al., Empirical Analysis of Drug Approval-Drug Patenting Linkage
for High Value Pharmaceuticals, 8 NW. J. OF TECH. AND INTELL. PROP. 174, 174-227 (2010),
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1102&context=njtip
[https://perma.cc/RC5S-RHEQ].
61. See Gorlin, supra note 42.
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Developing countries, particularly those that house generic drug
companies, such as India, should define the boundaries of the term “new”
carefully considering the patent status as well as the protection status for
the data abroad. Some countries have defined the term to encourage
innovator pharmaceutical companies to register new chemical entities as
soon as they apply for marketing elsewhere in the world. 62 Such a
definition means to prevent evergreening of the data and facilitate quicker
entry of the generic product into the market. For example, under a
regulation circulated under Jordan’s Food and Drug Administration
(JFDA) law, “in order to be considered new, a chemical entity should be
submitted for registration to the JFDA within eighteen months of its first
approval in any other country.” 63 A definition along these lines can
prevent misuse by the originator during the data protection period.
I believe that developing countries, especially those like India and
Brazil, should appreciate that for pharmaceutical companies and countries
that are lobbied by them, such as the United States, data exclusivity
represents an economic opportunity to preserve their market for just a
little longer even if the patent is invalidated. Unlike these countries, for
developing countries where the access to medication question remains
dominant, it is important to use all available flexibilities and establish a
coherent approach.
E.

“Known” Chemical Entities

The definition of the term “new chemical entity” in Article 39 raises
several questions on the definition of “new.” 64 It particularly raises
questions with reference to “known” chemical entities. Whether “new”
chemical entities also include chemicals or formulations already “known”
within the same or another related field remains unresolved. The term
“known” chemical entities typically tend to refer to different forms of an
existing chemical entity, such as esters, ethers, polymorphs etc., and
newer combinations or formulations of known chemicals that yield
benefits that may be different from already known benefits. 65 Generally,
if the chemical entity had been previously received and subject to scrutiny
by the drug regulatory authority, it should not benefit from a second
62. See generally Armouti & Nsour, supra note 41.
FOOD
AND
DRUG
ADMINISTRATION,
63. See
id.;
see
also
JORDAN
http://www.jfda.jo/Default.aspx [https://perma.cc/Q3U5-AXSH] (last visited Aug. 15, 2014).
64. Basheer, supra note 32 (discussing the various interpretations of the “new” definition, such
as whether “new” refers to the first global application in the world; and whether the term includes
chemical entities previously known or disclosed).
65. See generally, infra note 67.
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protection period even if the application is for a different disease or
treatment. Such a definition of “known” can also conserve regulatory time
spent in examining different versions of known chemical entities and can
help channelize that time to more thoroughly examine new drugs and
chemical entities, especially in places where regulatory resources may be
lesser, such as in developing countries.
On this question, Canada serves as a great example for developing
countries. It does not allow data protection for known drugs (especially if
they were previously used to develop orphan indications) on the grounds
that such drugs would not be deemed to be “innovative.” 66 In fact, under
the Canadian Food and Drug Regulations of 2006, an “innovative drug”
is defined as “a drug that contains a medicinal ingredient not previously
approved in a drug by the Minister [of Health] and that is not a variation
of a previously approved medicinal ingredient such as a salt, ester,
enantiomer, solvate or polymorph.” 67 Further, several decisions of the
Federal Court of Canada have upheld a strict interpretation of the terms
“previously approved” and “variation” within the definition of
“innovative drug.” For example, in a decision involving Epicept
Corporation’s application to market the drug CEPLENE for a new
oncology indicator, the court determined that the active ingredient
(histamine dihydrochloride) was not “innovative” and thus could not
benefit from data protection because it had been previously approved for
an unrelated homeopathic use. 68 Importantly, the approval for CEPLENE,
based on a full package of clinical trial data, was refused even though
homeopathic drugs are not approved in the same manner as therapeutics
in Canada. 69 Similarly, the Federal Court of Appeals of Canada sustained
a decision that refused to treat THALOMID as an “innovative drug” on
the basis that its active ingredient (thalidomide) had been previously
approved in Canada decades earlier. 70 This is despite the fact that the
earlier drug had another clinical usage and was subsequently withdrawn
from the market for being unsafe. 71 The applicant, Celgene, claimed its
drug was in fact an “innovative” drug in view of newly generated clinical

66. Megan Kendall & Declan Hamill, A Decade of Data Protection for Innovative Drugs in
Canada: Issues, Limitations, and Time for a Reassessment, 35 BIOTECHNOL L. REP. 259, 259-67
(2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5178005/ [https://perma.cc/D3TP-SBXE].
67. See Canadian Food and Drug Regulations, C.R.C., c. 870/2017, C.08.004.1(1).
68. Epicept Corp. v. Canada (Health), [2010] F.C. 956 (Can. Ont.).
69. Id.
70. Celgene Inc. v. Canada (Health), [2012] F.C. 154 (Can. Ont.).
71. Canada (Health) v. Celgene Inc., [2013] F.C.A. 43 (Can. Ont.).
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trial data for a completely different disease condition than the original
product. 72
The United States treats “new” to include “new dosage forms and
combinations” (which essentially includes known uses of known entities).
In the United States, the prior approval of a drug containing an active
ingredient does not preclude a finding of the presence of active ingredients
in a later application.73 In trade negotiations, especially in the Free Trade
Agreements with other countries, the United States tends to prefer a
definition that does not clearly differentiate known chemical entities from
new chemical entities that are eligible for data protection. Developing
countries should understand the various options and what each of these
options entails to their national interests before blindly succumbing to
pressure from the United States.
F.

Does New Chemical Entity Include Biologics?

On the face of it, biologics are not included within the scope of
Article 39.3’s requirement to protect new chemical entities.74 The NCEs
should not, by definition, include biologics. The decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, holding that naturally occurring products are
not per se patentable when denying the patentability of an isolated,
naturally occurring DNA sequence, makes it harder to justify the
protection of any test data by treating biologics as “new.” 75 Similarly, the
USPTO Guidance for Determining Subject Matter Eligibility of Claims
Reciting or Involving Laws of Nature, Natural Phenomena, & Natural
Products asserts that:
[C]hemicals derived from natural sources (e.g., antibiotics, fats, oils, petroleum derivatives, resins, toxins, etc.); foods (e.g., fruits, grains, meats
and vegetables); metals and metallic compounds that exist in nature;
minerals; natural materials (e.g., rocks, sands, soils); nucleic acids; organisms (e.g., bacteria, plants and multicellular animals); proteins and
peptides; and other substances found in or derived from nature . . . [will
be considered natural and hence, will be not be considered patentable
unless the] claim as a whole recite[s] something significantly different

72.
73.

Kendall & Hamill, supra note 66.
Aparna Nemlekar, Nicole Stakleff & Raymond Miller, FDA Is Evolving on Qualifications
HAMILTON
LLP
(Sept.
7,
2016),
For
‘New
Chemical
Entity’,
PEPPER
http://www.pepperlaw.com/publications/fda-is-evolving-on-qualifications-for-new-chemical-entity2016-09-07/ [https://perma.cc/RZ3Y-YQMP].
74. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8.
75. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
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than the judicial exception(s). 76

Similar language is employed in the 2016 Guidelines clearly highlighting
requirements for rejection on the basis of the law of nature or natural
phenomenon exception. 77
Considering that data exclusivity is for “new” “chemical” entities, it
would be harder to justify data protection for biologics that are denied
patent protection because they lack novelty on account of falling within
the scope of “naturally occurring products.” There is nothing in Article 39
that requires something that is not considered “new” in patent law to be
treated as “new” for the purpose of data exclusivity.
Nevertheless, there is also a line of argument that asserts that because
patents are likely to be either not granted or invalidated more quickly with
biologics, drug companies would be discouraged from investing in
research over biological substances which remain important for certain
types of therapies, such as cancer therapies.78 Others assert that “biotech
products, like monoclonal antibodies, are very difficult for generic
companies to develop and the absence of data exclusivity in a country
would discourage the originator company from entering this market,
which would have the deleterious effect of depriving people of the
benefits of these drugs.” 79 These arguments are typically used to lobby
higher levels of data protection on the grounds that innovative firms need
such protection for their investment in clinical trials and data collection,
regardless of patentability of the involved biologics.80 It is notable that in
the United States the Affordable Health Care for America Act in 2009
extended a 12-year exclusivity period for biologics. 81
These arguments are not persuasive for developing countries
considering that their obligations are limited to those outlined in Article
39 of TRIPS. Further, the current abysmal state of the health care system
in the United States, the high cost of prescription drugs, and the criticisms
by public health and consumer groups opposing the enormous influence

76. Andrew Hirshfeld, USPTO Procedure For Subject Matter Eligibility Analysis Of Claims
Reciting Or Involving Laws of Nature, Natural Phenomena, & Natural Products (Mar. 4, 2014).
77. See Robert Bahr, Formulating a Subject Matter Eligibility Rejection and Evaluating the
Applicant’s Response to a Subject Matter Eligibility Rejection (Mar. 4, 2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ieg-may-2016-memo.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZX42-SF2W].
78. Skillington & Solovy, supra note 10, at 2−6.
79. See Armouti & Nsour, supra note 41.
80. See Lybecker, When Patents Aren’t Enough, supra note 12.
81. Affordable Health Care for America Act, 155 CONG. REC. H12623, 12784 (Nov. 7, 2009).
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that pharmaceutical companies have over the various American
administrations are all reasons for not following the U.S. system. 82
G.

Reliability of Clinical Trial Information from Other Countries

The question of whether it is acceptable to rely on clinical trial data
of another country has much significance to countries that do not house
innovative pharmaceutical companies. Historically, before the TRIPS
Agreement was negotiated, most countries allowed reliance on originator
test data to approve generic products. Generic manufacturers had to only
prove bioequivalence, which is that their product is chemically identical
to the brand name, original product. 83 The approach that has been
historically followedthe pre-TRIPS approachwas consumer friendly
in that it enabled introduction of generics into the market as soon as the
patent expired. The importance of preserving the historic approach is
underscored by the recent United Nations Secretary-General’s HighLevel Panel on Access to Medicines Report, 84 the WIPO Development
Agenda, 85 and the WHO Studies, 86 all of which highlight the importance
of access to medication. It is a documented fact that generics have not
only been able to save costs, but have also enabled access to medication
in several parts of the world. 87
82. See Test Data Protection for Medical Inventions, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Aug. 8,
2017), https://www.keionline.org/testdata [https://perma.cc/QEG4-G2TL].
83. Generic manufacturers should establish bioequivalence for each compound. Note that
bioequivalence can be proved for a different salt too, although, within agreed bioequivalence levels.
See generally Christoph Baumgärtel et al., What Lessons can be Learned from the Launch of Generic
Clopidogrel?, 1 GABI J. 58 (Mar. 5, 2012), http://gabi-journal.net/what-lessons-can-be-learnt-fromthe-launch-of-generic-clopidogrel.html [https://perma.cc/C4HU-Q9BE] (highlighting issues that
arise with reference to generic clopidogrel because manufacturers used the technicalities of Plavix’s
European patent protection early and produced clopidogrel in a different salt, such as the besylate salt.
Thus, the generic version was launched for secondary prevention of certain uses clearly and
strategically excluding primary syndromes. This prevented health authorities from using the generic
medication for some conditions thus sustaining the use of the branded medication.). Especially when
there are secondary patents, there have been controversies about how some pharmaceutical companies
misuse this provision. For example, with the drug pregabalin, the manufacturer had different patents
for different indications. The company threatened to take physicians to court if the generic version
was prescribed to treat neuropathic pain instead of the patented version. See Brian Godman et al.,
Generic Pregabalin: Current Situation and Implications for Health Authorities, Generic and
Biosimilar Manufacturers in the Future, 3 GABI J. 125 (June 12, 2015),
https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/53359/ [https://perma.cc/ZRH3-TN3V].
84. See Report of the United Nations, supra note 5.
85. See generally Development Agenda for WIPO, supra note 5.
86. Silverman, supra note 5; see also Over 1 Million Treated with Highly Effective Hepatitis
C Medicines, supra note 5.
87. See, e.g., Generics Could cut Costs of Cancer Drugs by Over 99%, GABI (Apr. 14, 2017),
http://www.gabionline.net/Generics/Research/Generics-could-cut-costs-of-cancer-drugs-by-over-99
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Currently, India, like the United States, has established regulations
that require an applicant for a new drug to engage in extensive testing and
clinical trials. But, the requirement may be waived for purposes of “public
interest” or if the new drug has been approved and marketed for several
years in other countries. 88 Thus, the Indian Drugs and Cosmetics Act of
1940 provides for data exclusivity for a “new drug” under section 122E
(for a total period of four years from the date of approval). 89 The Indian
law does not connect the definition of a “new drug” with its patent status
but defines it as a drug which has not been used in the country to any
significant extent. A new drug in India is a product that: 1) has not been
recognized or licensed in India; 2) has been recently licensed and
approved for marketing; 3) is a combination drug individually approved
earlier but will be marketed as a combination; or 4) is a vaccine and
Recombinant DNA (r-DNA) derived drug.
Similarly, the Argentinian Law on the Confidentiality of Information
and Products, No. 24,766 outlines that with respect to new chemicals not
previously registered in Argentina or in any other country (listed in
Addendum I), information on the effectiveness and safety of the product
should be provided to the local Public Health Authority. 90 The law further
adds that the product already registered in Argentina or in any of the
countries listed in the Addendum, will be authorized by the Public Health
Authority for marketing. 91 Thus, known chemicals (even those unknown
nationally but known in addendum countries) are covered under this.
[https://perma.cc/A35S-B9RH]; Brian Godman et al., Payers Endorse Generics to Enhance
Prescribing Efficiency: Impact and Future Implications, a Case History Approach, 1 GABI J. 69, 6983
(2012),
http://gabi-journal.net/payers-endorse-generics-to-enhance-prescribing-efficiencyimpact-and-future-implications-a-case-history-approach.html
[https://perma.cc/3SEA-TN44]
(asserting that the savings from generics when compared with the originator is considerable); see also
Alexandra Cameron et al., Switching from Originator Brand Medicines to Generic Equivalents in
Selected Developing Countries: How Much Could be Saved?, 15 ELSEVIER, VALUE IN HEALTH 664
(2012),
http://www.valueinhealthjournal.com/article/S1098-3015(12)01547-1/pdf
[https://perma.cc/A86N-3JSX]; see also Brian Godman et al., Multiple Policies to Enhance
Prescribing Efficiency for Established Medicines in Europe with a Particular Focus on Demand-Side
Measures: Findings and Future Implications, 5 FRONTIERS IN PHARMACOLOGY 1 (June 2014)
(highlighting some of the policies that Europe pursued to maintain universal health care).
88. See Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, at § 122E (amended 1995) (India), http://cdsco.nic.in
[https://perma.cc/7Z2T-28DE].
89. Id.
90. See Law of Confidentiality on Information and Products that are Legitimately Under the
Control of a Person and is Disclosed in a manner Contrary to Honest Commercial Uses, No. 24,766
Articles 4 and 5 (Arg.); Data Exclusivity: Encouraging Development of New Medicines, INT’L FED’N
PHARMACEUTICAL
MANUFACTURERS
ASS’N,
(July
2011)
at
10-11,
OF
https://www.ifpma.org/resource-centre/data-exclusivity-encouraging-development-of-newmedicines/ [https://perma.cc/UJ4D-CLRG].
91. Id.
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The Indian and Argentinian requirement discussed above is a
standard norm to avoid duplication of trials in different jurisdictions
which can result in increasing the cost and delaying the introduction of a
generic drug in the market. Clinical trials are costly not just financially
but also in terms of the patient suffering. That is, during the time period
when a trial is being conducted, other patients wait in the pipeline;
similarly, the administering of the drug as part of the trial to wrong patient
groups can lead to detrimental side effects. So, if a study has already been
extensively conducted, unless there are red-flags in that study that require
further investigation, or population variations that warrant a different
study (for example, impact of a drug on Asians versus African
Americans), to reinvent the same study may just be an exercise draining
valuable time and cost.
The use of data from other countries raises questions about their
protection status. The typical question as to whether data undisclosed in
one part of the world should be considered undisclosed in another part of
the world remains unclear. Thus, if Company A discloses the data to the
USFDA and then submits the same data in India after, say, four years,
should India treat it as undisclosed, and if so, for how long? The ideal
situation would be that if the drug regulator seeks information that is under
protected status in another country, then it should be considered protected
for the same length of time. 92 Assume that after seeing Company A’s
application, a drug regulator in India wants particular clinical trial data
from the United States that will enjoy two more years of protection in the
United States; India should similarly protect the data for the remaining
two years. Under the same logic, and considering that intellectual property
laws are territorial in nature, any data voluntarily submitted in excess of
what is required to approve the product in India need not be subject to
such protection. Therefore, when data is reused in a second country, it
may be subject to the laws and conditions of that country. Thus, the second
country may extend the “undisclosed” status for the remaining term,
taking the year of the first jurisdiction that applied protection into
consideration. This view has been supported by academics like Carlos
Correa and in other countries as well. 93 The geographic flexibility remains
important for all countries to carefully define the limits of the undisclosed
term to balance with local healthcare needs.

92. See generally Armouti & Nsour, supra note 41.
93. Carlos Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPs Agreement: Protection of Data
Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 69, 72-73 (2002); see also
Armouti & Nsour, supra note 41.
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Should Exclusivity be Relaxed when National Markets are Not
Being Supplied?

“National markets not being supplied” is a ground for imposing a
compulsory license under the TRIPS Agreement. 94 Countries like India
and Chile have statutorily included this as a ground for imposing
compulsory licenses. 95 When such a provision is effectuated to impose a
compulsory license, similar to what happened when Bayer did not supply
Nexavar in India, in the interest of the public, patents rights are
suspended. 96 Under those circumstances, the “public interest” exception
outlined in Article 39 can be used to create statutory exceptions in national
legislations to the use of the data for approving a competitor’s application
to supply the market. For example, under Chile’s Industrial Property Law,
pharmaceutical products not being marketed in the Chilean territory
within 12 months from the registration or health authorization issued in
Chile, or where the owner of the test data engages in conduct deemed
contrary to free competition, are two specific exceptions to data
exclusivity provisions (as well as over the patent monopoly) meant to
provide access to healthcare. 97
The United States does not follow the above prescription. Arguably,
the United States embraces the most stringent data protection regime. In
the Fabrazyme case, the National Institute of Health (NIH), dealing
specifically with the question of refusing to exercise march-in rights, 98
noted that the U.S. rules on test data exclusivity granted an absolute
monopoly on the data that could not be waived even when the originator
was unable to supply the U.S. market. 99 This was in response to a patient
group petition filed to the NIH on the grounds that the patent owner and
its exclusive licensee harmed public health by severely rationing the
supply of agalsidase beta, which is the only approved therapeutic
treatment for Fabry disease. 100
That said, the United States has come under pressure from the public.
So far, the NIH has resisted using the march-in rights; but the rights exist
under the Bayh-Dole Act. 101 Recently, the NIH, regarding Xalatan, which

94. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 8, at Art. 31.
95. See The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1970 (as amended in 2005) at § 84 (India).
96. Bayer v. Natco M.P. Nos 74–76 of 2012 and M.P. No.108 of 2012 (India).
97. Industrial Property Law, supra note 50; see also FINK, supra note 50, at 394.
98. 35 U.S.C.S. § 203 (LexisNexis 2017).
99. See Test Data Protection for Medical Inventions, supra note 82.
100. See 2010 Fabrazyme March-in Request, KNOWLEDGE ECOLOGY INT’L (Aug. 8, 2017),
https://www.keionline.org/fabrazyme [https://perma.cc/SE83-NQMG].
101. 35 U.S.C.S. § 200 (LexisNexis 2018).
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is an expensive drug used for glaucoma treatment, 102 defended its
hesitancy to interfere using the march-in power to correct excessive
pricing on the grounds that it could alter the market dynamics for all
products developed pursuant to licensing rights under the Bayh-Dole
Act. 103 But, the NIH has clearly indicated that this is an area ripe for
congressional consideration. 104 Any congressional action to consider
administrative, regulatory, or other forms of interference into the pricing
of pharmaceuticals will have to deal with the question of data exclusivity
over the clinical trials, although that may not happen anytime soon.
I.

Data Exclusivity & Patent Linkage

The last issue that relates to data exclusivity is patent linkage. The
tying in of patent information with the data exclusivity is called patent
linkage. 105 Basically, when patent linkage is instituted, it would deem
marketing approval of a competitor’s product as a patent violation if there
is patent protection over the application material. The question is whether
TRIPS requires drug regulatory authorities to consider patent status before
approving a generic substitute for marketability. Pharmaceutical
companies assert that Article 39 of the TRIPS Agreement requires
national governments to statutorily include patent linkage provisions. 106
Such a patent linkage provision will essentially add an additional
responsibility on the drug regulator and prevent them from clearing any
competing versions of a drug for marketing if there is a patent prevailing
on any similar version of the application material. 107
The benefit of reading patent linkage into TRIPS is that typically,
after the patent expires, the innovator will indirectly enjoy a market
monopoly (market exclusivity as defined earlier in this Article) until the
drug regulator clears the generic version which can be anywhere from two
102. Elias A. Zerhouni, Director, NIH, In the case of Xalatan, Manufactured by Pfizer, Inc.
(Sept. 17, 2004), https://www.ott.nih.gov/sites/default/files/documents/policy/March-in-xalatan.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9MME-ZWC8].
103. 35 U.S.C.S. § 200 (LexisNexis 2018).
104. See Zerhouni, supra note 102 (“[T]he NIH believes that the issue of whether drug pricing
should be consistent across the spectrum of developing countries is one that would be more
appropriately addressed by Congress, as it considered these matters in a larger context.”).
105. See id.
106. See, e.g., Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. No.7833 of 2008, Aug. 18, 2009;
see also Bayer Corporation & Anr v. Union of India & Ors, Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Writ
Petition No.7833 of 2008, Aug. 18, 2009.
107. See Ravikant Bharadwaj, K.D. Raju & M. Padmawati, The Impact of Patent Linkage on
Marketing of Generic Drugs, 18 J. OF INTELL. PROP. RTS. 316-22 (2013),
http://www.isglp.org/papers/india/ravikant/Ravikant%20Bhardwaj%20Publication%20(3).pdf
[https://perma.cc/XK5S-4PTU].
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to four years after the expiration of patent protection. A study by the
Federal Trade Commission highlighted that typically there is a 4- to 40month delay in the introduction of the generics when there is patent
linkage. 108 For poorer nations, imposing the linkage requirement will add
one more regulatory layer involving additional cost and time. Patent
linkage is a mechanism typically used to delay the entry of generic
competition into the market.
Developed countries, especially the United States, assert that during
the patent period, drug regulators should be prevented from approving a
generic substitute. The United States unilaterally pressures other countries
to include patent linkage provisions statutorily. 109 In the United States, the
history of patent linkage is unique. When the Hatch-Waxman Act 110 was
enacted, innovator pharmaceutical companies realized that they cannot
deny generic drugs to the market anymore. Hence, patent linkage was
proposed as an alternative to delay the entry of generic competition. 111
Thus, when a generic drug company makes an application (ANDA
application), the FDA will process the application only if there is no valid
patent on the same. 112 But, this has no international or universal relevance
nor is this sound public health policy.
Canada, which tries to maintain a balance between innovator and
generic pharmaceuticals, has a more nuanced approach wherein the
Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations (NOC
Regulations) 113 provide for patent linkage. Under this, as part of seeking
108. Chuan-feng Wu, Raising the Right to Health Concerns within the Framework of
International Intellectual Property Law, 5 ASIAN J. OF WTO & INT’L HEALTH LAW & POL’Y, 141,
141-205 (March 2010).
109. Id. In 2011 alone, about 16 countries, many of them developing, added patent linkage terms
as part of its bilateral agreement with the United States. Id.
110. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Publ. L. No. 98417, 1586-1605, (1984).
111. See, e.g., Ron A. Bouchard et al, Emphirical Analysis of Drug-Approval-Drug Patenting
Linkage for High Value Pharmaceuticals, 2 NW. J. OF TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 174, 174-227 (2010)
(“The linkage regulation regime in particular has proven to be an excellent vehicle for firms to obtain
extended legal protection on drugs at all stages of development, including drugs about to come off
patent protection, drugs moving through the regulatory approval stage, and drugs that are currently in
development.”).
112. See, e.g., Federal Food Drug & Cosmetics Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 505(j)(2)(A)(vii) (1938),
which requires the ANDA applicant to state information, including the following: that such patent has
expired (a paragraph II certification); the date on which such patent will expire (a paragraph III
certification); or that such patent is invalid, unenforceable, or will not be infringed by the manufacture,
use, or sale of the new drug for which the application is submitted (a paragraph IV certification).
113. The Patented Medicines (Notice of Compliance) Regulations, GOV’T OF CAN. (Oct. 27,
2016),
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/drug-products/
applications-submissions/guidance-documents/patented-medicines/notice-complianceregulations.html [https://perma.cc/KZ5P-XCSR].
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marketing approval from Health Canada for a generic drug, the generic
manufacturer is required to address the issues from any patents that the
innovator may assert against it in a summary proceeding which can lead
to either a patent validity or infringement litigation, under some
circumstances. 114
The question is not whether patent linkage is beneficial or not. In
fact, countries that house innovator pharmaceutical companies will cater
to patent linkage because it is in their best interest. Countries such as India
(which predominantly houses a generic drug industry), and Brazil and
Chile (which provide for universal health coverage) will be disadvantaged
with patent linkage because it largely serves to delay generic drugs from
entering into the market.
In India, marketing approval of drugs is not linked with the status of
patents. The Indian position is that linking patent data with drug approval
increases the burden of the generic drug company to prove the existence
or otherwise of patents, and adds another layer of responsibility over the
administrator. 115 The question of whether Article 39 obligates members
to establish patent linkage arose in India in relation to the approval of a
generic version of “sorafenib tosylate,” a drug used to treat renal cell
cancer. 116 The Supreme Court sustained the judgment of the Delhi High
Court which dismissed the argument that patent linkage formed a part of
the Article 39 obligation. Bayer, the patent owner, approached the
Supreme Court of India to prevent the grant of marketing approval to
Cipla. 117 Bayer asserted that the TRIPS Agreement necessitated the
establishment of patent linkage preventing the drug controller from
approving the marketing of drugs whose patent was not owned by the
applicant, Cipla. The Delhi High Court was persuaded by the presence of
a Bolar Provision under Section 107A of the Indian Patents Act of 1970
which specifically exempted the use of data for regulatory processes from
infringement with a view to permit immediate availability of generic

114. See generally Kristina Lybecker, Intellectual Property Rights & Bio-pharmaceutical
Industry: How Canada Measures Up, FRASIER INST. (Jan. 2017), https://www.fraserinstitute.org/
sites/default/files/intellectual-property-rights-protection-and-the%20biopharmaceutical-industry.pdf
[https://perma.cc/25XW-W5AZ].
115. See The Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970 § 107(A); see also Srividhya Ragavan, Data
Exclusivity: A Tool to Sustain Market Monopoly, 8 JINDAL L. REV. 241, 241-60 (2017).
116. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. No.7833 of 2008, Aug. 18, 2009; see also
Bayer Corporation & Anr v. Union of India & Ors, Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Writ Petition
No.7833 of 2008, Aug. 18, 2009.
117. Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Writ Petition No. No.7833 of 2008, Aug. 18, 2009; see also
Bayer Corporation & Anr v. Union of India & Ors, Bayer Corp. v. Union of India, Writ Petition
No.7833 of 2008, Aug. 18, 2009.
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drugs in the market when the patent expires. 118 Nevertheless, that is an
item that the United States has sought from India repeatedly under the
Special 301 process on the grounds that Article 39 of TRIPS requires it. 119
Chile’s bilateral free trade agreement with the United States
mandates patent-registration linkage and exclusive rights to
pharmaceutical test data. 120 Professor Carsten Fink notes that “Chile has
implemented these obligations in a way that has sought to protect public
health, promote coherence with patent rules, prevent anticompetitive
behavior, and avoid imposing an undue burden on Chile’s public health
authority.” 121 Chile has a patent linkage requirement under Resolution
5572 which obligates the Institute of Public Health to publish all
applications for health registration on its website. 122 The information on
regulatory approvals are electronically posted to enable patent holders to
monitor regulatory requests and seek an injunction from a Chilean court
to prevent issuing the marketing approval if the patent holder believes that
a pharmaceutical application for which a regulatory approval to market is
sought infringes on a patent. 123
Importantly, Article 39 of TRIPS is certainly not worded to impose
patent linkage. 124 Even assuming that it was the case, such a reading of
Article 39.3 will not survive the Doha Declaration on Public Health. 125
Data exclusivity and patent linkage also affects the operation of
compulsory licenses. 126 Otherwise, even when there is a public health
118. The Patents Act, supra note 115.
119. See, e.g., Srividhya Ragavan, Sean Flynn & Brook Baker, Justifying India’s Patent
Position to the United States International Trade Commission and Office of the United States Trade
Representative, 7 INDIAN J. INTELL. PROP. LAW 1 (2015) (discussing the unilateral U.S. pressure on
India to amend its patent laws in a manner not conducive to provide access to health-care for its poorer
citizens).
120. Chile–United States Free Trade Agreement (signed June 6, 2003),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/asset_upload_file535_3989.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NB3Q-28ED].
121. FINK, supra note 50, at 394; see also Chile-United States Free Trade Agreement (signed
June
6,
2003),
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/
asset_upload_file535_3989.pdf [https://perma.cc/NB3Q-28ED].
122. Industrial Property Law, supra note 50; Law No. 19.039, Revised, Coordinated and
Systemized Text of The Industrial Property Law, Resolution 5572 of the Chilean Institute of Public
Health, Mar. 9, 2006, Ministry of Economy [BCN] (Chile), http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/
en/details.jsp?id=5324 [https://perma.cc/LK7R-ZUXQ] (providing overview of enactment of patent
linkage requirements and amending Chilean Law No. 19.039 on Industrial Property, further
containing a link to Resolution 5572 itself).
123. See also FINK, supra note 50, at 394.
124. See, e.g., id. at 391 (“The TRIPS Agreement does not impose any obligation of this kind.”).
125. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 ILM 746, ¶ 17 (2002).
126. See, e.g., Industrial Property Law, supra note 50.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol51/iss4/6

32

Ragavan: Data Exclusivity

2017]

DATA EXCLUSIVITY

1195

crisis, the presence of patent linkage can prevent a regulator from
approving the drug that may be needed to preserve public health
conditions. Thus, any reading of Article 39 of TRIPS to impose patent
linkage requirements will be read as violating the Doha Declaration on
Public Health. 127
IV. CONCLUSION
The access to medication questions have become a burden that
TRIPS continues to bear poorly. As patents and the cost of drug prices
have become increasingly unpopular, 128 data exclusivity has morphed into
a more potent tool benefitting from vigorous focus from pharmaceutical
lobbying groups. 129 The unfortunate development seems to be that data
exclusivity is quickly becoming a hurdle to public health. Notably, the
public has a vested interest when any form of exclusivity is legally
created, especially when it prevents or detrimentally affects access to life
saving medication.
Considering this, it is critical for developing countries to determine
the extent of protection and to effectively use the public interest exception
of Article 39.3. It is acknowledged that data exclusivity as a tool
detrimentally affects generic competition. 130 Thus, it is no coincidence
that developing countries and free trade partners have been pressured by
the United States Trade Representative to further extend data
protection. 131 Whether it be data exclusivity provisions or other TRIPS-

127. Id.
128. Ghinea et.al., supra note 44; see also Ayalew Tefferi et al., In Support of a Patient-Driven
Initiative and Petition to Lower the High Price of Cancer Drugs, MAYO CLINIC PROC. 996 (Aug.
2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mayocp.2015.06.001 [https://perma.cc/M4PL-BCZ4]; see also
Donald Light & Hagop Kantarjian, Market Spiral Pricing of Cancer Drugs, CANCER, 3900 (Nov.
2013),
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/cncr.28321/epdf
[https://perma.cc/9TVLRNUW]; see generally Brian Godman et al., Patent Expiry and Costs for Anti-cancer Medicines for
Clinical Use: Expiry and Costs Anti-cancer Medicines, 6 GENERICS AND BIOSIMILARS INITIATIVE J.
(GABI J.) 105 (2017), https://strathprints.strath.ac.uk/60241/ [https://perma.cc/M7SR-5XXW].
129. See, e.g., Ragavan, Data Exclusivity, supra note 115; see also Srividhya Ragavan, The
Significance of the Data Exclusivity and its Impact on Generic Drugs, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. STUD. 131,
134-37 (2017).
130. See Xavier Seuba, Pharmaceutical Test Data Protection & Human Rights, P. K. Yu, (Ed.),
Reshaping Intellectual Property Law through a Human Rights Lens, Cambridge University Press,
2017 (extensively discussing access to medication issues from data exclusivity).
131. The much higher standard of data exclusivity sought under the now-failed Trans-Pacific
Partnership is a great example. See Lybecker, When Patents Aren’t Enough, supra note 12; see
generally What does the TPP say About Data Exclusivity and Biosimilars?, MANAGED CARE,
https://www.managedcaremag.com/focus/what-does-tpp-say-about-data-exclusivity-and-biosimilars
[https://perma.cc/K8FA-ZHYH] (last visited Mar. 7, 2018). Similarly, in trade negotiations, and in
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plus requirements to patent statutes, developing countries should
appreciate that such compromises need not be emulated in every market,
especially in countries that have a policy focus on enabling access to
medication. 132 In reality, for developing countries, generics have become
a part of the global pharmaceutical industry. In fact, globally, generic
drugs have become a necessary component of the pharmaceutical food
chain, not only to cater to the access to health needs, but also to kick start
innovation in poorer nations. It is also undisputed that historically,
copying has been the first step for innovation even in the developed world.
Thus, for innovation in pharmaceuticals to proliferate all over the
world, generics will serve as the first step to kick start the industry.
Especially for less-developed countries, the leap to innovation in
pharmaceuticals will occur only when they take the first step of being able
to establish generic drug manufacturing facilities locally. Further, even in
developed nations where there is much patent fetish, such as the United
States, the astronomical cost of medication has resulted in an increased
appreciation for the role of generics. Thus, generics are viewed as an
important component to enable market competition, to challenge bad
patents, and to provide access to medication. Developing countries such
as India and Brazil should not back pedal into limiting the generic
manufacturers without having a clear roadmap to provide alternative
access to medication, which it lacks now.

Free Trade Agreements with other countries, the United States tends to prefer definitions that interpret
Article 39 more stringently in a manner requiring a much higher data protection requirement.
132. See Maria Phelan & Catherine Cook, A Treatment Revolution for Those Who can Afford
it? Hepatitis C Treatment: New Medications, Profits and Patients, BMC INFECTIOUS DISEASES
(2014), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4178584/ [https://perma.cc/HCF5-RFPS]
(discussing how the company allowed some countries to make these new medicines available at cost
for their populations or appreciable discounts); see also Winnie de Bruijn et al., Introduction and
Utilization of High Priced HCV Medicines across Europe; Implications for the Future, 7 FRONTIERS
IN
PHARMACOLOGY
(2016),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/27516740
[https://perma.cc/V38K-Q8J8]; see also Srividhya Ragavan, Patients Win Over Patents, THE HINDU
(Mar.
7,
2013),
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/patients-win-overpatents/article4482469.ece [https://perma.cc/SLZ6-D7XS]; see generally, Ragavan & Dave, The
Right Prescription to the IPR Debate, HINDUSTAN TIMES, (Sept. 29, 2014),
http://www.hindustantimes.com/ht-view/the-right-prescription-in-the-ipr-debate/storyaEvB8EGLIsoweSdpozDwBI.html [https://perma.cc/5PNN-SVA9].
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